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Leibniz has been accused of being ambivalent about the nature of sensible qualities such as color, 
heat, and sound. According to the critics, he unwittingly vacillates between the view that these 
qualities are really just complex mechanical qualities of bodies and the competing view that they are 
something like the perceptions or experiences that confusedly represent these mechanical qualities. 
Against this, I argue that the evidence for ascribing the first approach to Leibniz is rather strong, 
whereas the evidence for imputing the second approach to him is rather weak. The first, 
“mechanistic” approach should therefore be regarded as his considered view. 
 
 
Margaret Wilson famously accused Leibniz of being ambivalent about the 
nature of sensible qualities such as colors, sounds, odors, flavors, and heat
1
. On her 
view, there are many texts in which he treats these qualities as nothing more than 
complex microphysical or micromechanical qualities of bodies, yet many others in 
which he speaks of them as if they were something over and above these minute 
qualities, such as our confused perceptions or experiences of them. Even worse, 
Wilson contends, texts of both sorts sometimes appear virtually side-by-side in 
Leibniz’s writings, as if he were unconsciously vacillating between the one 
approach and the other. The implication is that he gave little thought to the nature of 
these qualities and somehow failed to notice his tendency to alternate between 
incompatible perspectives. “It is amazing”, Wilson reflects, “that he was able to 
overlook such a conspicuous appearance of inconsistency”2. 
Nicholas Jolley agrees. He maintains that “even a limited analysis suggests that 
Leibniz is ambivalent in his treatment of the possession of colour concepts”3. He 
then proceeds to sketch the main points of Wilson’s interpretation and concludes 
that her assessment of the situation is “largely convincing”4. 
After many years of going unchallenged, Wilson’s criticisms have recently 
begun to draw fire from scholars who have undertaken to defend Leibniz against 
the charge of ambivalence
5
. I applaud these efforts. Indeed I have argued elsewhere 
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that Leibniz has not only a coherent but a highly distinctive and philosophically 
interesting theory of color
6
, something which would be highly doubtful if Wilson 
were right about Leibniz’s ambivalence toward the nature of sensible qualities 
being a “pervasive” and “unrationalized” feature of his thinking7. Nevertheless, it 
seems to me that Leibniz’s defenders have not really succeeded in acquitting him of 
Wilson’s charge. For one thing, their replies are themselves based on questionable 
interpretive hypotheses. For another, they fail to accurately diagnose the missteps 
in Wilson’s reasoning, and consequently fail to correct those missteps. 
My aim in what follows is to offer a better defense of Leibniz against the charge 
of ambivalence. In the first part of the essay, I present the evidence for ascribing to 
Leibniz the view that sensible qualities are reducible to the mechanical qualities of 
bodies, and I argue that this evidence is rather strong. In the second, I consider the 
three lines of evidence Wilson gives to show that Leibniz sometimes thinks of 
sensible qualities as reducible instead to something like experiences, and I argue 
that this evidence is rather weak. In light of these facts I conclude that the first, 
“mechanistic” approach represents his considered view. 
 
 
1. Sensible Qualities as Shapes and Motions 
  
Texts in which Leibniz suggests that sensible qualities are reducible to the 
minute mechanical qualities of bodies are not hard to find. The most explicit of 
these texts appear in relatively early writings. For instance, in a 1669 letter to his 
teacher Jacob Thomasius, he writes: “[I]t is clear that the explanation of all 
qualities and changes must be found in magnitude, figure, motion, etc., and that 
heat, color, etc., are merely subtle motions and figures”8. Nearly a decade later, in a 
1678 letter to Herman Conring, he makes essentially the same point: “What is more 
probable than that all sensible qualities are merely tactual qualities varying 
according to the variety of sense organs? But touch recognizes only magnitude, 
motion, situation, or figure and various degrees of resistance in bodies”9. Similarly, 
in other texts probably written around this same time (i.e., the late 1670s), Leibniz 
emphasizes that on his view the “confused” attributes of the senses, that is, sensible 
qualities, can always be reduced to (or resolved into) “distinct” attributes such as 
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size, shape, and motion
10
. Remarks this explicit are hard to find in later writings, 
but as we will see, those writings do contain indications that Leibniz continues to 
think of sensible qualities in this way. 
As to which particular distinct qualities the confused qualities of the senses are 
to be reduced, Leibniz is typically non-committal. He mentions a number of 
proposals, including that red is “the rotation of certain small globes”, heat “a vortex 
of very fine dust”, and sound something “produced in air as circles are in water 
when we toss a stone into it”11. Yet he usually stops short of endorsing such 
proposals. Still, his reluctance appears to spring solely from doubts about the 
details of these accounts, and not about their general form: he clearly thinks these 
are the right sorts of accounts to give of sensible qualities. Two cases in which he 
does endorse a specific proposal are that of white and black. He believes that “white 
is what reflects the most light and black what reflects the least”12. Some years later, 
he refines his proposal for white: “[W]hite bears no resemblance to a spherical 
convex mirror, even though it is nothing but the assemblage of a number of small 
spherical mirrors, such as we see in froth upon close inspection”13. Clearly the 
thought is that white reduces to certain tiny shapes in bodies that reflect light.
14
 
Other remarks provide less explicit evidence for reading Leibniz this way. In 
his Meditationes de cognitione, veritate, et ideis, he explains that  
 
“when we perceive colors or smells, we certainly have no perception other than that of shapes and 
motions, though so very numerous and so very small that our mind cannot distinctly consider each 
individual one in this, its present state, and thus does not notice that its perception is composed of 
perceptions of minute shapes and motions alone, just as when we perceive the color green in a 
mixture of yellow and blue powder, we sense only yellow and blue finely mixed, even though we do 
not notice this, but rather fashion some new thing for ourselves”15. 
 
 When Leibniz claims that in perceiving colors or smells “we certainly have no 
perception other than that of shapes and motions”, the clear implication is that 
colors and smells really just are shapes and motions; for otherwise in perceiving a 
color or smell we would be perceiving more than just those mechanical qualities. 
Furthermore, Leibniz indicates in this text that our perceptions of sensible qualities 
are composed of petites perceptions of minute shapes and motions
16
. This point is 
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significant because he also believes that if a perception P is composed of 
perceptions p1, p2, …, pn, then that which P represents is composed of those things 
which represent p1, p2, …, pn. As he explains in a letter to Samuel Masson, “when 
there is a perception of the whole, there are at the same time perceptions of the 
actual parts”, and “that which is composition of parts outside is represented only by 
the composition of modifications in the monad”17. In claiming that our perceptions 
of color and smell are composed of perceptions of shapes and motions, therefore, 
Leibniz appears to be suggesting that these sensible qualities themselves are 
composed of shapes and motions—that, in other words, sensible qualities are really 
just complexes of shapes and motions
18
. 
In other passages Leibniz claims that our ideas and perceptions of sensible 
qualities represent tiny shapes and motions in bodies. For instance, in the Nouveaux 
essais Theophilus argues that our ideas of sensible qualities “depend on the detail 
of shapes and motions and express [i.e., represent] them exactly, though we cannot 
disentangle this detail in the confusion of the surpassing multitude and smallness of 
the mechanical actions which strike our senses”19. But to say that an idea or 
perception represents a certain thing is just to say that it is an idea or perception of 
that thing. Hence, if ideas of sensible qualities represent shapes and motions, then 
the implication is that these qualities just are shapes and motions. 
It is worth noting that this sort of “mechanist” approach to sensible qualities is 
important to Leibniz for two closely-related reasons. The first concerns his 
conviction that God has created a maximally intelligible world, a world in which 
nothing is in principle inexplicable. This conviction is relevant to the nature of 
sensible qualities because on Leibniz’s view such qualities are in themselves 
merely confused, “occult” qualities. Accordingly, if these qualities were 
fundamental features of the universe, then the universe would be fundamentally 
inexplicable to the extent that these qualities are present within it. Leibniz, 
however, denies that the world has any fundamentally inexplicable features. Hence, 
given that there are sensible qualities, it follows that they are not fundamental 
features of this universe. Rather, they must be reducible to, and explicable in terms 
of, more distinct and intelligible qualities of bodies. But according to Leibniz the 
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only such qualities are mechanical qualities, and so sensible qualities must be 
reducible to such qualities
20
. 
A second reason for reducing sensible qualities to mechanical ones stems from 
Leibniz’s celebrated principle of sufficient reason, according to which there is 
always a sufficient reason why things are one way rather than another. As Leibniz 
has it, one corollary of this principle is that causes must always be connected in 
some non-arbitrary fashion with their effects. Thus, there must be some 
non-arbitrary connection between my ideas (and perceptions) of sensible qualities 
and their causes
21
. According to Leibniz, however, such a connection could obtain 
only if my ideas of sensible qualities resembled their causes, which are mechanical 
qualities. Hence, in order to satisfy the principle of sufficient reason, Leibniz 
thinks, my ideas of sensible qualities must be similarly complex
22
. More exactly, 
they must be composed of simpler ideas which are themselves ideas of the 
mechanical qualities that enter into their cause. As I pointed out above, however, to 
say that our ideas of sensible qualities are composed of ideas of mechanical 
qualities is just to say that the former qualities are reducible to the latter ones. So 
according to Leibniz, the principle of sufficient reason requires that sensible 
qualities be reducible to the causes of our ideas of them, that is, to certain 
mechanical qualities in bodies. 
In this section, we have encountered a wide range of texts that point to the 
conclusion that Leibniz wants to reduce sensible qualities to the tiny shapes and 
motions in bodies. We have also seen that Leibniz’s reasons for favoring this sort of 
approach are deeply rooted in his philosophy. I think it’s safe to say that none of 
this would be denied by Wilson. But she would be quick to caution us not to regard 
this approach as Leibniz’s considered view of sensible qualities. On her view, there 
are many other texts in his writings that point to another, competing approach to 
sensible qualities, some of which even appear alongside those which suggest the 
mechanist approach. At best, she would say, Leibniz is ambivalent about the nature 
of these qualities and does not have a settled view of the matter. Let us now turn to 
Wilson’s case for this conclusion. 
 
 
2. Sensible Qualities as Experiences? 
 
According to this second approach, sensible qualities are reducible not to the 
micromechanical qualities of bodies but to the sensible-quality experiences they 
cause within us. This approach represents sensible qualities as “completely bound 
up with the nature of sensory experience” or even as “somehow identified with the 
experiences”23. 
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Whereas the evidence for the approach discussed above was largely direct, the 
evidence Wilson offers for this second approach is only indirect. There are virtually 
no texts in which Leibniz actually characterizes sensible qualities as experiences, 
sensations, or perceptions, and no such texts are offered by Wilson
24
. Instead, her 
evidence boils down to three claims that Leibniz repeatedly makes and that 
allegedly imply that he is thinking of sensible qualities as in some way identified 
with or at least bound up with sensory experience. The first claim is that we cannot 
define such qualities, the second that we can have no idea of such qualities apart 
from sensations of them, and the third that the micromechanical qualities in bodies 





2.1. Definitions and Distinct Notions 
 
Leibniz frequently claims that that we cannot have distinct notions of sensible 
qualities on the ground that it is beyond our ability to define these qualities. 
Although we recognize them when we see them, and easily distinguish them from 
one another, thus making our notions of them clear, “we can neither distinguish nor 
unfold what they contain”26. Consequently, we cannot give an account or definition 
of these qualities: “all we can do is make them known through examples”27. 
Though our notions of sensible qualities may be clear, then, they are not distinct but 
confused. 
We have seen that in many texts Leibniz represents sensible qualities as 
reducible to shapes and motions. According to Wilson, however, his belief that we 
cannot define sensible qualities suggests that he sometimes favors an alternative 
approach. Here’s why. As Wilson correctly notes28, Leibniz appears to regard our 
inability to define sensible qualities not just as a contingent limitation resulting 
from our lack of scientific understanding but as an essential limitation on our 
powers
29
. If sensible qualities are reducible to shapes and motions, however, then it 
ought to be only a matter of time before we discover to which shapes and motions 
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exactly they reduce. And once we know this, we ought to be able to define them in 
terms of these mechanical qualities. As Wilson explains, 
  
“[I]f we are allowed to suppose that a red object, for example, is just one that reflects light waves of 
such and such frequency in such and such circumstances, there is no obvious reason why we could 
not ascribe to ourselves a distinct notion of red, even on the supposition that our (sense) perceptions 
are all confused. We would be able to say, for instance, that red objects differ from all others in that 




 Since Leibniz denies that we can define colors in this way, Wilson concludes, 
he must be thinking of them not as complexes of physical or mechanical qualities, 
but as something like the experiences that confusedly represent those qualities. 
Only under that supposition can we explain why it is impossible for us to define 
colors even while in possession of physical-theoretical accounts of what makes 
bodies appear colored. 
To see what has gone wrong here, we need to look more closely at Leibniz’s 
views on definition. Start with the fact that he distinguishes three basic ways of 
defining a thing. According to the first, a definition specifies marks sufficient for 
recognizing the thing and distinguishing it from other things. According to the 
second, a definition explains how the thing is generated or produced. According to 
the third, it resolves the concept of the thing into primitive concepts. The first sort 
of definition Leibniz calls nominal, the second causal, and the third perfect. 
A nominal definition specifies one or more distinguishing features of the 
definiendum, as for example when gold is defined as the heaviest metal or as a 
metal that resists cupellation and is insoluble in aqua fortis
31
. Such marks are only 
“external features” of the thing and must be distinguished from its “inner 
essence”32. To define gold as we just have is not to capture its essence, but only to 
identify certain external or superficial features of the metal that suffice for 
recognizing and distinguishing it. Nominal definitions do not therefore express a 
thing’s essence. Furthermore, since on Leibniz’s view essence and possibility are 
equivalent, it follows that nominal definitions do not establish the possibility of 
their definienda. To define gold as a metal that resists cupellation and is insoluble in 
aqua fortis is not to show that such a metal is even possible. In the same way, we 
could define parallel straight lines as lines in the same plane that would not meet 
even if extended to infinity, but this nominal definition would in no way guarantee 
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that such lines are even possible
33
. For all we can tell from these definitions 
themselves, they may well be harboring contradictions. 
In this respect, nominal definitions contrast with both causal and perfect 
definitions, which do establish the possibility of their definienda. This makes 
causal and perfect definitions instances of what Leibniz calls real definitions, 
definitions that capture the essence of a thing and thus express its possibility. An 
example would be the definition of a circle as “a figure described by the motion of 
a straight line in a plane about a fixed end”34. This is a causal definition because it 
tells us how a circle is generated. It’s also a real definition, since in specifying how 
to generate a circle, it establishes the possibility of such a figure. Similarly, a 
perfect definition establishes the possibility of a thing by analyzing its concept into 
the primitive concepts that enter into it, in the process ruling out the possibility that 
the complex concept harbors a contradiction
35
. 
With these distinctions in place, we are now in a position to see where Wilson 
has gone wrong. She ascribes to Leibniz the view that sensible qualities cannot be 
defined. But this is not exactly correct. Though Leibniz does occasionally say 
simply that sensible qualities cannot be defined, he almost always takes care to 
clarify that what we cannot do is give nominal definitions of these qualities.
36
 His 
point is not that we cannot develop physical-theoretical accounts of these qualities, 
but rather that we cannot articulate marks sufficient for recognizing and 
distinguishing these qualities. Further, he consistently maintains that a confused 
notion is one for which we lack not any definition whatsoever, but a nominal 
definition in particular. So when he claims that our notions of sensible qualities are 
confused, even ineluctably so, this is not at all incompatible with the claim that we 
can give real definitions of such qualities. Indeed, Leibniz explicitly acknowledges 
that though we cannot nominally define sensible qualities, we can or at least will 
eventually be able to give real definitions for them:  
 
“[S]imple terms do not admit of nominal definition, but [...] terms that are simple only from our 
point of view because we have no way of analyzing them into the elementary perceptions of which 
they are composed—e.g., terms like hot, cold, yellow, green—do admit of real definitions which 
would explain what causes them. Thus the real definition of green is to be composed of a thorough 
mixture of blue and yellow, though green can no more be given a nominal definition, through which 
                                                     
33
 NE III, III, §18/A VI, 6, 295. 
34
 De synthesi et analysi universali seu arte inveniendi et judicandi (De synthesi et analysi); A VI, 4, 
541/L, 230. 
35
 In some passages Leibniz distinguishes between definitions real in themselves and those real 
through experience (see Discours de métaphysique §24; A VI, 4, 1567-1568/AG, 56; NE III, III, 
§18/A VI, 6, 294). Definitions of the former sort establish the possibility of their definienda 
themselves. Causal and perfect definitions would be examples, for the reasons just given. In 
contrast, a definition real through experience does not itself express the possibility of the thing, but 
nevertheless is a definition of a thing that is known to be possible because it has actually been 
experienced. Though no nominal definition is real in itself, Leibniz says that nominal definitions are 
often real through experience. In a sense they are both nominal and real. In general, however, when 
Leibniz speaks of real definitions he appears to have in mind ones that are real in themselves. 
36
 See De organo; A VI, 4, 160/MP, 4; De synthesi et analysi; A VI, 4, 540/L, 230; Leibniz to 
Wolff, 21 February 1705; GP V, 18/Breifwechsel zwischen Leibniz und Christian Wolff. Edited by 
C. I. Gerhardt. Halle – H. W. Schmidt 1860 (LW), p. 18; Lettre; GP VI, 500/AG, 187; NE II, XXI, 
§41/A VI, 6, 194; NE II, XXIX, §4/A VI, 6, 255-256; NE III, IV, §§4-7/A VI, 6, 296-297. 
9 
 
it could be recognized, than can blue or yellow”37. 
  
 As we can see here, the discovery that green is really a mixture of yellow and 
blue does indeed give us a real, and more specifically a causal, definition of green. 
But it does not give us a nominal definition and therefore our notion of green 
remains confused even after this discovery has been made. In the same way, even if 
we were to discover that some color is really just a certain configuration of tiny 
shapes and motions, this would only give us a real definition of that color; our 
perceptions of the color would still appear simple and thus we would not be able to 
articulate a nominal definition of the quality. 
Wilson’s mistake, then, is that she fails to appreciate an important nuance in 
Leibniz’s account. While it is true that we cannot give definitions of sensible 
qualities in the sense of nominal definitions, and for this reason our notions of such 
qualities are ineluctably confused, we can give real definitions of those qualities 
once we have acquired a sufficiently advanced understanding of the mechanical 
basis of the corresponding perceptions. 
One objection we might imagine a critic raising at this juncture is that a real 
definition of the sort Leibniz admits we can have for sensible qualities ought to 
qualify as a nominal definition too. For example, if green is defined as a mixture of 
yellow and blue, then this would seem to provide us with a way of explaining green 
to someone who had never experienced it in such a way as to allow that person to 
recognize green and distinguish it from other colors. All the person would have to 
do is view an object under a microscope to determine whether or not it exhibits a 
mixture of yellow and blue. If the object does indeed look like a mixture of yellow 
and blue under magnification, then this would confirm that the object is green. And 
if it does not, this would confirm, at least provisionally, that it isn’t green. In the 
same way, if we were to define a color in terms of the way an object reflects light, 
as Wilson suggests in her example, then it would seem that the use of a 
spectrometer would allow even a blind person to identify whether an object does or 
doesn’t have that color. In short, if we succeed in developing a theoretical account 
of some color, then we ought to have not only a real but a nominal definition of that 
quality. 
The flaw in this objection is that it misrepresents the nature of the marks that 
constitute a nominal definition. In order to count as having a nominal definition, 
Leibniz evidently thinks, it is not enough that we know marks whose presence 
indirectly indicates the presence of the thing defined. Rather, we must have marks 
that can be directly perceived in the thing:  
 
“[I]f we had arrived at the inner constitutions of certain bodies, these [sensible] qualities would be 
traced back to their intelligible causes and we should see under what circumstances they were bound 
to be present; even though it would never be in our power to recognize their causes sensorily, in our 
sensory ideas which are the confused effects of bodies acting on us. For instance, we now have a 
complete analysis of green into blue and yellow, and almost all our remaining questions about it 
concern these ingredients; yet we are totally incapable of disentangling the ideas of blue and yellow 
within our sensory idea of green, simply because it is a confused idea”38. 
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 As Leibniz explains in this text, it is not enough for a distinct idea or nominal 
definition that we be able to infer on empirical grounds that green consists of 
yellow and blue. Rather, we must be able to see green as a mixture of yellow and 
blue; as Leibniz puts it, we must be able to disentangle the ideas of yellow and blue 
within our sensory idea of green
39
. Yet this is something we just can’t do, no matter 
how much theoretical knowledge we might have of that quality. In the same way, 
even if I know that red is a certain complex mechanical quality in virtue of which 
the red object reflects light within a certain range of wavelengths, this brings me no 
closer to a nominal definition of red, since I cannot perceive any such mechanical 
quality in the quality red. Though I may have experimental evidence for thinking 
that red reduces to that mechanical quality, and though that theoretical knowledge 
may supply me with a kind of indirect mark of red, it will never supply me with a 
mark that red can directly be seen to exhibit. Hence, I cannot give a nominal 
definition of this color
40
. 
This way of viewing the matter might seem to have an odd consequence. 
Leibniz holds that our knowledge is of higher quality to the extent that it is more 
distinct. But on the account I have given, our knowledge of a sensible quality does 
not become more distinct, even as we develop better and better theoretical 
definitions of it. For all those theoretical definitions tell us, they bring us no closer 
to having a nominal definition of the quality and therefore no closer to having a 
distinct idea of the quality. This, however, is strange. It would seem that as we 
develop better theoretical definitions of a quality, our knowledge of its nature is 
improving. And if it improves enough, then we ought to count as having a distinct 
notion of the quality, it seems, even if we cannot define it in the special way 
required for a nominal definition. 
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This puzzle highlights the fact that on Leibniz’s view we can learn a great deal 
about the nature of a thing without thereby acquiring a distinct notion of it. As he 
sees it, our knowledge of a thing is better to the extent that we can distinguish 
within our notion of the thing the simpler notions that enter into it. In the ideal case, 
we would be able to distinguish a notion’s primitive ingredients within it. Leibniz 
calls this adequate knowledge, and though he is unsure whether humans ever 
actually attain it
41
, he does believe that we can approach it to the extent that we can 
distinguish simpler notions within our more complex ones. This is precisely what 
the term “distinct” is meant to signify: distinct notions are those in which we have 
made some progress toward attaining adequate knowledge, that is, toward 
distinguishing within the notion the simpler notions that enter into it. In the case 
where we learn through experimentation that certain notions must enter into a more 
complex notion, however, we do not succeed in distinguishing anything in the latter 
notion. If the microscope allows us to discover that the notions of yellow and blue 
must enter into our notion of green, that gets us no closer to distinguishing any 
notions within our notion of green. Despite all our advances in optics, we are no 
closer to being able to see yellow and blue within green, or discerning the notions 
of yellow and blue within our notion of green, than we ever were. And so our notion 
of green continues to be confused, despite the fact that our theoretical knowledge of 
that color is impressive and continues to grow. 
Leibniz’s insistence that we cannot nominally define sensible qualities in no 
way conflicts with his belief that they are reducible to the mechanical qualities of 
bodies. Wilson’s failure to attend to the distinction between real and nominal 
definitions leads her to see tensions in Leibniz’s thinking that could only be 
explained in terms of a pervasive ambivalence toward the nature of sensible 
qualities. But once we attend sufficiently to this distinction, it becomes clear that 
there is no tension here at all. He consistently and coherently maintains that we can 
give real but not nominal definitions of sensible qualities. That is, we can explain 
the circumstances under which these qualities arise, but we cannot even begin to 
distinguish within them any underlying nature. For all our theoretical advances, 
they appear as simple and primitive as ever. 
 
 
2.2. Congenital Blindness 
 
Wilson’s second line of evidence consists of passages in which Leibniz claims 
that we cannot explain sensible qualities to those who have never sensed them. 
Here is a typical example of such a passage, which Wilson quotes in her critique:  
 
“[W]e recognize colors, smells, tastes, and other particular objects of the senses clearly enough, and 
we distinguish them from one another, but only through the simple testimony of the senses, not by 
way of explicit marks. Thus we cannot explain what red is to a blind man, nor can we make such 
things clear to others except by leading them into the presence of the thing and making them see, 
smell, or taste the same thing we do [....] This is so even though it is certain that the notions of these 
qualities are composite and can be resolved because, of course, they do have causes”42. 
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 Leibniz admits that our notions of these qualities can be resolved into more 
primitive notions, and his evidence for this is that such qualities (or our notions of 
them) have causes. His thought is evidently that we can resolve our sensible quality 
notions into notions of mechanical qualities such as shapes and motions, which can 
be thought of as the causes of sensible qualities (or at least of our experiences of 
them). But in this very same passage, he claims that we cannot explain what red is 
to a blind person. This, according to Wilson, is puzzling. If red is just the complex 
of shapes and motions into which our notion of red can be resolved, then nothing 
should prevent us, at least in time, from being able to explain the nature of red to a 
person born blind. Yet Leibniz insists that we cannot explain what red is to such a 
person. This tension in Leibniz’s thinking is, by Wilson’s lights, yet another sign of 
his ambivalence about sensible qualities. When he claims that color notions can be 
resolved, he seems to be thinking of colors as nothing more than complexes of tiny 
shapes and motions. But when he denies that we can explain color to someone 
without showing it to them, he seems to be thinking of colors as something over and 
above the mechanical qualities that correlate with our color experiences, something 
like the experiences themselves
43
. 
One strategy for dealing with texts of this sort would be to suppose that Leibniz 
views our inability to explain sensible qualities in terms of other, more intelligible 
qualities as only a temporary limitation resulting from our limited understanding of 
the nature of sensible qualities. Understood in this way, his claim that we cannot 
explain what red is to a person born blind would be perfectly consistent with the 
view that red is reducible to shapes and motions and can in principle be explained in 
terms of these other qualities. However, though many of Leibniz’s statements on 
this topic are admittedly compatible with this sort of reading, on the whole they 
weigh against it. In the first place, he admits that we have made some progress in 
understanding the nature of at least some sensible qualities. For instance, he thinks 
we have discovered that green is really a mixture of yellow and blue. This, it would 
seem, ought to allow us to explain green to a person who has never seen that color, 
so long as they have seen yellow and blue. Yet even while acknowledging this 
discovery he still denies that we can carry out such explanations
44
. 
Moreover, there is one text in which he makes quite clear that our inability to 
explain sensible qualities has nothing to do with our ignorance of their underlying 
natures. In the preface to what Leibniz intended to be a short book on the elements 
of natural science, he imagines a group of people who live in a land with no heat. 
These people, he tells us,  
 
“could not be made to understand what heat is [quid sit calor] merely by describing it, for even if 
someone were to explain to them the innermost secrets of nature and even interpret perfectly the 
cause of heat, they would still not recognize heat from this description if it were presented to 
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 Instead, what is needed for them to understand heat is a sensation: “if someone 
were to kindle a fire near them, they would at length learn what heat is [quid sit 
calor]”. In the same way, “a man born blind could learn the whole of optics yet not 
acquire any idea of light”46. As these remarks make clear, it is not because of 
inadequacies in our understanding of optics or of the nature of heat that we cannot 
explain these qualities to those who have never sensed them. 
Wilson takes passages such as these as evidence that Leibniz was thinking of 
sensible qualities as something over and above the mechanical qualities to which, 
in some moods, he thought they could be reduced. But this is not the only plausible 
way of reading these passages
47
. 
When Leibniz speaks of our inability to explain what qualities like red and heat 
are, it is natural for us to interpret him as claiming that we cannot explain the 
underlying natures of these qualities, for instance, whether red is really a certain 
complex of tiny shapes and motions. But this is not, I think, what he really had in 
mind. When he says that we cannot explain what a sensible quality is, what he 
means, I would suggest, is that we cannot explain it in such a way as to 
communicate to someone a clear notion of that quality, that is, a notion that would 
allow them to recognize and distinguish the quality by sensory means. There are 
explicit indications that this is what Leibniz had in mind. In his discussion of the 
people from a heatless land, he says that we could not explain to them what heat is 
because even if we apprised them of the “innermost secrets of nature” and of the 
cause of heat, “they would still not recognize heat from this description if it were 
presented to them”48. Clearly what is at issue in Leibniz’s mind is not whether we 
can explain the underlying nature of heat, but whether we can explain heat in such a 
way as to enable someone to recognize it when they feel it. His point is that we 
cannot give someone this kind of recognition-enabling notion through any sort of 
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 In her response to Wilson, Bolton suggests that our inability to acquire a concept of a sensible 
quality apart from any acquaintance with that quality is actually perfectly consistent with Leibniz’s 
mechanistic-reductive account. This is because on her reading, acquiring a concept of a quality apart 
from experiencing it requires being in possession of a “complete and thoroughly distinct” definition 
of that quality, something we could not expect to have even on the assumption that sensible qualities 
are reducible to mechanical qualities (“Primary and Secondary Qualities” (see note 5), pp. 17-18; cf. 
“Sensible Qualities and Sufficient Reason” (see note 5), p. 142). This reading of Leibniz helps make 
sense of his claim that a man born blind could “learn the whole of optics yet not acquire any idea of 
light” (A VI, 4, 2003/L, 285). However, in the Nouveaux essais, written some two decades later, he 
takes a different view. There it is said that what the man born blind lacks is not an idea of light or 
colors but “a conception of the clear-confused, that is, the image of light and colors” (NE II, IX, 
§8/A VI, 6, 137). Moreover, Leibniz indicates that a man born deaf and mute can have ideas of 
things that do not have shape even though he cannot experience them in the way we normally do 
(ibid.). What are we to make of this apparent change of view? It is certainly possible that Leibniz 
simply changed his mind at some point between the writing of these works. However, I consider it 
more likely that the comments in the Nouveaux essais represent his considered view and that in the 
earlier work he misstated his view. What he should have said, I believe, is that the man born blind 
cannot acquire a clear or distinct idea of light. 
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explanation, but only by exposing them to heat. Similarly, in the Nouveaux essais 
he specifically says that what the congenitally blind person cannot achieve is “a 
conception of the clear-confused, that is, the image of light and colors”49. What this 
person cannot acquire is not necessarily an understanding of the underlying nature 
of light and colors, but rather an idea or mental image of them that would allow her 
to recognize them by sight. 
Understood in this way, nearly all of Leibniz’s remarks about what a person 
born blind can and cannot know about color are consistent with the idea that 
sensible qualities are just complexes of shapes and motions. As we saw in Section 
2.1 above, one can know everything there is to know about the underlying nature of 
a quality and yet still lack a clear, much less a distinct, notion of that quality. A 
clear notion requires that we be able to recognize a thing in virtue of certain marks 
that it can be directly perceived to exhibit. A distinct notion requires not only that 
we be able to recognize the thing but that we be able to articulate the marks in virtue 
of which we recognize it. Clearly a person born blind can have neither sort of 
notion, since one who cannot see color can neither recognize it in the requisite way 
nor articulate the marks in virtue of which they recognize it in this way. But this 
does not rule out the possibility that such a person could acquire some notion of 
color by learning about its underlying nature. For all its value, such a notion would 
evidently be neither clear nor distinct, but obscure. 
In conclusion, Leibniz’s remarks about what a blind person could or could not 
know about color do not rule out the possibility of explaining what color is in the 
sense of explaining its underlying nature. But they do rule out the possibility of 




2.3. Color and Its Causes 
 
In one instance Wilson describes Leibniz’s alleged ambivalence about sensible 
qualities in these terms:  
 
“[H]e vacillates between saying that physics tells us what sensible qualities are or consist in, and 
saying that physics tells us the causes of sensible qualities. Insofar as he inclines to the former view, 
he thinks of sensible qualities as properties in the physical objects that happen to be discriminable by 
the senses. Insofar as he inclines to the latter view, he thinks of the nature of a sensible quality as 
completely bound up with the nature of sensory experience [...]”50. 
 
 The former view, of course, is the reductive approach discussed above in 
Section 1. It says that colors are really just complexes of certain micromechanical 
qualities of the bodies that appear colored to us in ordinary perception. The latter 
view, in contrast, says that sensible qualities either are or are bound up with the 
experiences these mechanical qualities cause in us. We have already considered 
two lines of evidence for ascribing the latter view to Leibniz. In this passage, 
Wilson alludes to a third: Leibniz’s propensity for saying that the qualities 
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described in physics are not sensible qualities but rather the causes of such 
qualities. The texts she evidently has in mind are those in which Leibniz says that 
sensible qualities, as well as our concepts of such qualities, must be complex 
because after all they do have causes (i.e., the micromechanical qualities in 
bodies)
51
. If the minute shapes and motions that physics reveals to be the causes of 
our perceptions of sensible qualities are not what these qualities are or consist in, 
but merely what causes them, the thought goes, then sensible qualities must be 
something over and above these shapes and motions. In short, a thing cannot be 
identified with its cause. 
In assessing this evidence, let us first observe that Leibniz is quite happy to 
speak of the underlying nature of a quality as its cause. This is evident, in the first 
instance, in his account of causal definitions. As the name suggests, a causal 
definition specifies how a thing arises or is caused. But as a species of real 
definition, it also gives an account of what a thing really is. Thus, in definitions of 
this sort the underlying nature of a thing is being equated with its cause. It is also 
evident in those passages in which he reasons that sensible qualities (or our notions 
of them) must be complex because they have causes. To say that an apparently 
simple quality is complex is to acknowledge that it has an underlying nature (and a 
complex one at that). But the mere fact that a quality has causes does not in itself 
imply that it is complex or has a complex underlying nature: even simple qualities, 
it seems, could have causes. Leibniz’s inference therefore makes sense only if we 
understand him to be thinking of a quality’s causes as its underlying nature. 
In speaking of a thing’s underlying nature as its cause, I would suggest that 
Leibniz is merely speaking in accordance with appearances, as he does in a variety 
of contexts. A nature is said to be “underlying” precisely because it isn’t the nature 
a thing initially appears to have. On Leibniz’s view, green is really just a mixture of 
yellow and blue. At a deeper level of analysis, it’s really just an assemblage of tiny 
shapes and motions. But when we perceive the color green, we do not perceive it as 
having either of these natures. At the level of appearances, then, it is natural to think 
of the mixture of yellow and blue, or the corresponding micromechanical qualities, 
as causes of green, rather than as its underlying nature. This is why Leibniz is 
willing to speak of the micromechanical qualities of bodies as the causes of sensible 
qualities, even though he believes that at a deeper level of analysis qualities of the 
latter sort just are qualities of the former sort
52
. 
Even if Leibniz’s willingness to speak thus in accordance with appearances 
were illegitimate, what matters for our purposes is that his doing so need 
not—indeed should not—be taken as evidence that he is thinking of sensible 
qualities as something over and above their causes. As he is using the term in this 
context, a thing’s cause just is what it really is, its underlying nature. 
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Wilson maintains that Leibniz sometimes thinks of sensible qualities as bound 
up with the corresponding experiences. I hope it is now clear that the evidence she 
offers for this conclusion is rather weak. In contrast, we have seen that the evidence 
for ascribing to Leibniz the rival view that sensible qualities are reducible to the 
micromechanical qualities of bodies is quite strong. The right conclusion to draw is 
that Leibniz consistently favored the latter, mechanist approach, and that he did not 
vacillate between the one view and the other. Contrary to the claims of Wilson, he 
was not ambivalent about the nature of sensible qualities. 
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